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Abstract
Secret key agreement (SKA) is an essential primitive in cryptography and information security. In
a multiterminal key agreement problem, there are a set of terminals each having access to a component
of vector random variable. The goal of the terminals is to establish a shared key among a designated
subset of terminals. This problem has been studied under different assumptions about the adversary’s
information, the most general case corresponding to the setting where adversary’s information is rep-
resented by a random variable that is correlated with all terminals’ variables. Secret key capacity for
this general adversary that is known as the wiretap adversary, is not known in the general case. In this
paper, we calculate the wiretap secret key capacity of a Tree-PIN, and present a protocol that achieves
this capacity for SKA among an arbitrary subset of terminals. We relate our work with known results
and discuss future directions for research.
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of a secret key agreement (SKA) protocol is to establish a shared secret key (SK)
among a designated set of users such that those that are outside the group have no information
about it. This problem has been studied in different settings. SKA in the source model and two
terminal setting was considered independently in [1, 2]. In this model, Alice and Bob (terminals)
have access to samples of two correlated variable X and Y , and the adversary, Eve, has access
to a correlated variable Z, where PXY Z is a publicly known probability distribution. Terminals
can communicate over a public authenticated channel to obtain a shared SK. A key agreement
protocols in this setting in general, has two phases: a public discussion phase during which
participants use the public channel communication to arrive at a common string, and privacy
amplification phase in which a common random key is extracted from the common string.
Multiterminal setting extends the above model to a set of m terminals M “ t1, . . . ,mu,
where the goal is for a subset A Ď M to obtain a shared secret key K. The model assumes
that all terminals including those in Ac “MzA, participate in the protocol. Let Xj denote the
random variable that is available to terminal j, and let XM be the vector of m correlated random
variables, pX1, . . . , Xmq. Eve’s side information Z about the terminals’ variables satisfies the
joint distribution PZXM , which is known publicly. The model was first proposed by Csiszár and
Narayan [3], who studied three types of adversarial side information.
1) Secret Key (SK) setting: The adversary has no information about XM.
2) Private Key (PK) setting: A known (by all terminals) subset of terminals D Ď Ac are
compromised and Z “ XD, where XD is the set of variables of D.
3) Wiretap Secret Key (WSK) setting: The adversary has some amount of side information
Z, and PZXM is public.
In all cases, the adversary also has full read access to public messages F. WSK is the most
general adversary type and weaker SK and PK types are special cases.
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The above general multiterminal source model was formalized in [3] where a single-letter
characterization of SK and PK capacities were proved. Here, the secret key capacity of a setting
is the maximum (asymptotically) achievable key rate in that setting. Finding a general expression
for multiterminal WSK capacity, even for the special case of two terminals, |A| “ 2, is an open
problem.
The Pairwise Independent Network (PIN) model [4], is a special case of the above setting
where the correlated variables of any pair of terminals is derived from a noisy channel that
connects them. Pictorially, a PIN assigns a pair of directed edges, one in each opposite direction,
to two terminals such that each edge corresponds to each reciprocal variable. An upper bound on
the SK capacity of PIN is given in [4], and a capacity achieving SKA protocol when A “M,
or when |A| “ 2, was proposed in [5]. The WSK capacity of a general PIN is still unknown.
Our Work:
We consider Tree-PIN, a special case of PIN where the connectivity graph is an undirected
tree, and derive the WSK capacity for A ĎM, when adversary’s information is a collection of
noisy versions of the pairwise shared variables between the terminals. We also present an SKA
protocol that achieves this capacity. This leads to a lower bound for a general wiretapped PIN,
using the Steiner Tree Packing of [5].
In a multiterminal setting, “omniscience”, is the state that every terminal knows the values
that are observed by other terminals. Omniscience is achieved through public discussion. In [3],
it was proved that PK capacity is equal to HpXM|XDq ´RCOpXM|XDq where RCOpXM|XDq
is the minimum communication rate for multiterminal omniscience. This latter quantity is rep-
resented by R1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ `Rm, where Rj is a real number representing the communication rate
(total communication divided by n, the number of observations by terminals) of terminal j to
achieve omniscience. The WSK capacity of any general setting was shown to be upper-bounded
by the PK capacity of the same setting when an additional dummy node, with access to variable
Z, represents the compromised node [3]. We propose an algorithm that solves the omniscience
problem for a Tree-PIN, and use the above relation between WSK capacity and PK capacity, to
obtain the WSK capacity of a Tree-PIN.
Related Work:
The SK and PK capacities of PIN has been studied when random variables are defined over a
finite filed [6, 7], and for special graphical connectivities [8, 9]. A generalization of PIN model
to hypergraphical sources is introduced in [10], and the SK capacity of such sources has been
studied in [10–12].
The multiterminal WSK capacity for special forms of adversary’s knowledge are given in [3, 5].
For example, in [5], a wiretapped PIN was considered in which the adversary’s knowledge is of
the form Z “ pZ1, . . . , Zmq, where for each j, Zj is correlated with Z 1j , where Z 1j is part of the
variable set held by terminal j.
We consider PINs with an underlying undirected graph, and we assume a more general
adversary whose variable Z is a collection of wiretapped variables each correlated with a shared
variable between each pair of terminals.
Organization:
We review the basic notions and definitions in Section II. Then, we present our main result
and the sketch of our proofs in Section III. Section IV concludes the paper by presenting some
extended results and remarks.
II. MULTITERMINAL SOURCE MODEL FOR SKA
We restrict ourselves to discrete probability distributions. We reserve upper-case letters for
random variables (RVs) and lower-case letters to denote their realizations. Upper-case calligraphic
letters (e.g., M, A, etc.) denote sets, and for any natural number m we define rms :“ t1, . . . ,mu.
Let M “ rms, then XM :“ pX1, . . . , Xmq and XA “ pXj| @j P Aq for any A Ď M. For an
arbitrary real vector RM “ pR1, . . . , Rmq P Rm and for any A Ď rms we define RA “ pRj| @j P
Aq, and sumpRAq :“ řjPARj .
A. Model and Definitions
We consider the general multiterminal source model, with a set of m terminals denoted by
M “ rms. A terminal j P rms has access to a random variable Xj . We denote the multiterminal
source by XM “ pX1, . . . , Xmq. Terminals use public discussion over a broadcast channel, that
is reliable and authenticated, for a finite number of rounds. A message that is broadcasted by
terminal j is a function of the terminal’s observations of Xj , and the previous public messages.
We denote by F the set of all messages sent over the public channel.
Eve has access to the side information Z which is correlated with XM, and full read (listen
to) access to public messages F. The joint distribution PZXM “ PZX1¨¨¨Xm is public.
Let A ĎM be the set of terminals who want to establish a shared secret key, denoted by K,
that will be secure against Eve. The secret key K must satisfy reliability and secrecy, but may
not be fully concealed from the helper terminals in Ac.
Definition 1. Consider a source model pXM, Zq with adversary’s side information, Z, and
A ĎM denoting the set of terminals that will share a key K with alphabet K. The key is an
p, σq-Secret Key (in short p, σq-SK) for A, if there exists a protocol with public communication
F, and output RVs tKjujPA, such that
(reliability) Pr tKj “ Ku ě 1´ , @j P A, (1)
(secrecy) SD ppK,F, Zq; pU,F, Zqq ď σ, (2)
where SD denotes the statistical distance and U is the uniform probability distribution over
alphabet K.
Key Rate of a Protocol: All terminals cooperate so that the terminals in A can obtain a shared
secret key. Consider the case that each terminal has n IID samples of their variable, denoted by
the vector Xnj (i.e., independently sampled from the distribution PZXM).
For a source with probability distribution PZXM , and a for given n, the secret key rate (SK
rate) of an SKA protocol family P that establishes an SK of length `Ppnq, is `Ppnq{n. The
asymptotically achievable SK rate of the protocol family is rP˚ “ lim infnÑ8 `Ppnq{n. The secret
key capacity of a given source is the supremum of all achievable SK rates.
Definition 2 (Secret Key Capacity). For a given source model pXnM, Znq and a set A ĎM,
let Sn,σn be the supremum key length of all pn, σnq-SKA protocols. Then the SK capacity is
CWSKpXA||Zq “ sup
n,σn
lim inf
nÑ8
1
n
Sn,σnpXnA||Znq, (3)
where the supremum is over all positive n, σn such that limnÑ8pn ` σnq “ 0.
When Z “ const. (i.e., independent of XM), the capacity is denoted by CSKpXAq, and when
Z “ XD “ pXj | j P Dq with D being the set of (known) compromised terminals, the capacity
is denoted by CPKpXA||XDq. An SKA protocol P is capacity achieving for a source if rP˚ is
equal to the capacity of the source.
Theorem 1 (PK Capacity [3]). In a given source model PXM for sharing a secret key among
terminals in A ĹM, with compromised terminals D Ď Ac, the PK capacity is
CPKpXA||XDq “ HpXM|XDq ´RCOpXA|XDq, (4)
where RCOpXA|XDq “ min
RDcPRCO
sumpRDcq and
RCO “ tRDc |sumpRBq ě HpXB|XBcq, @B Ă Dc,A Ę Bu .
Pairwise Independent Network (PIN) model was defined in [4].
Definition 3 (PIN model). A set M “ rms of m terminals with Xj denoting the RV of ter-
minal j P M, is a Pairwise Independent Network (PIN), if the RVs Xj are of the form
Xj “ pVji| @k PMztjuq where pairs of RVs tpVij, Vjiq| 1 ď i ă j ď mu are mutually indepen-
dent.
We use the same practically reasonable convention of [10–14], and assume that Vij “ Vji for
any j ‰ k.
In [5], for a general PIN, the case of Z containing
`
m
2
˘
variables tZij| i, j P rmsu where
Zij “ Zji and each Zij is correlated with pVij, Vjiq was left as an open problem. In this paper,
we consider this wiretapped PIN model for the special case when Vij “ Vji, with PZ|XM “ś
i,j PZij |Vij .
III. WSK CAPACITY OF TREE-PIN
A Tree-PIN is a PIN model with the graphical model of terminals represented as an undirected
tree G “ pM, Eq. We denote the edge that connects the nodes i and j by eij , and assume eij “ eji.
In a graph G “ pM, Eq, we denote the neighbours of a node j PM by Γpjq “ ti | i PM, eij P
Eu. The distance dpi, jq between two nodes i and j in a graph, is the number of edges of the
shortest path connecting node i and j, in the graph. When the graph is an undirected tree,
there is a single path between any two nodes i and j, and their distance dpi, jq will satisfy
dpi, jq “ dpj, iq.
Definition 4 (Tree-PIN). A set of m terminals form a Tree-PIN if there exists a tree G “ pM, Eq
with M “ rms such that the RV of any terminal j PM can be represented by Xj “ pVji| i P
Γpjqq, with Vij “ Vji, where all RVs in tVij| i ă j and eij P Eu are mutually independent.
The main contribution of this paper is the direct proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The wiretap secret key capacity of a Tree-PIN PZXM , defined as in Definition 4,
for terminals in A “M is
CWSKpXA||Zq “ min
i,jPT pAq
HpVij|Zq, (5)
and T pAq is the smallest subtree connecting all nodes of A.
For simplicity, we only present the sketch of the proof for A “ M; the general case is
proved in Appendix B. In Section III-A, we prove the upper-bound on the secrecy capacity,
and in Section III-B we argue that there exists an SKA protocol that achieves this upper bound
(asymptotically).
Minimize:
ř
jPM
Rj
Subject to:
ř
jPB
Rj ě HpXB|XBc , Zq, @B ĹM,
Rj P R`, @j PM.
Fig. 1: The LP problem of finding RCOpXM|Zq.
A. The Upper-Bound
Consider a Tree-PIN with M “ rms and G “ pM, Eq. Let the adversary be represented as a
dummy terminal m` 1 with Xm`1 “ XD “ Z, that is known to all terminals in A “ rms.
According to the PK capacity theorem ([3, Theorem 2]), the PK capacity of the aforementioned
PK setting is given by
CPKpXM||Zq “ HpXM|Zq ´RCOpXM|Zq, (6)
where RCOpXM|Zq denotes the solution to the real-valued Linear Programming (LP) problem
represented in Figure 1.
This PK capacity is a natural upper-bound on the WSK capacity of the Tree-PIN of M. (see
[3, Theorem 4]). Thus, we calculate the PK capacity and prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (The Upper-bound). For a Tree-PIN PZXM defined as in Definition 4, we have
CWSKpXM||Zq ď CPKpXM||Zq “ min
i,j
HpVij|Zq. (7)
Equation (6) implies that finding CPKpXA||Zq reduces to the problem of finding RCOpXM|Zq:
that is solving the LP of Figure 1. The following lemma implies Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. For a Tree-PIN with G “ pM, Eq, and the set of Vijs defined as in Definition 4, we
have
RCOpXM|Zq “ HpXM|Zq ´min
i,j
HpVij|Zq. (8)
Proof for Lemma 2 (Sketch): Consider an arbitrary edge eij P E . By cutting this edge, the
set of terminals will be partitioned into two parts. Rewriting the inequalities in the LP of Figure 1,
for these two sets of terminals and considering the fact that Vij’s are mutually independent and
their correlation with Z, we get HpXM|Zq “ ři,j HpVij|Zq and thus we haveÿ
jPM
Rj ě HpXM|Zq ´HpVij|Zq.
Since this holds for any arbitrary i and j, it is implied immediately that
RCOpXM|Zq ě HpXM|Zq ´min
i,j
HpVij|Zq. (9)
In the following proof, we find a rate assignment for RM, that satisfies the constraints of the
LP in Figure 1, and achieves the lower-bound of (9), thus proving Equation (8).
Rate assignment: Define HpVi˚j˚ |Zq “ mini,j HpVij|Zq, and set the Rj rates according to the
rate assignment described in Figure 2. In this rate assignment, the rate Rj is divided into |Γpjq|
components, where a component rRpjqi corresponds to a neighbor node i P Γpjq of j. Note that
for a pair i and j that form an edge in the tree, there exists component rates rRpjqi and rRpiqj . The
rate assignment rules of Figure 2 assign values to these component rates such that the resulting
sum rate meets the lower-bound of (9), while the sum of the component rates rRpjqi and rRpiqj does
not exceed HpVij|Zq.
Let pi˚, j˚q s.t. HpVi˚j˚ |Zq “ min
i,j
HpVij|Zq
For any j PM let Rj “ ř
iPΓpjq
rRpjqi .
To minimize
ř
jPM
Rj
assign rRpj˚qi˚ “ rRpi˚qj˚ “ 0, and
@ eij ‰ ei˚j˚ , with dpi, i˚q ă dpj, i˚q,
assign rRpjqi “ 0, and rRpiqj “ HpVij|Zq.
Fig. 2: The rate assignment that achieves RCOpXM|Zq.
Note that there are no loops in an undirected tree, and the path to a node i˚ from two adjacent
nodes i and j, differs only by one edge. Thus, either i, or j, is the closer of the two to i˚, and
the other node is one edge farther. Therefore, the above rate assignment will always succeed.
One can think of this rate assignment protocol as an algorithm that gets a weighted undirected
tree as the input and outputs a weighted directed tree such that if Rj denotes the sum of the
outgoing edge weights of node j of the output tree, then
ř
jPrmsRj is minimized. The input tree is
a weighted undirected tree for which the weight of eij is wi,j “ HpVij|Zq. For example, assume
that M “ r13s, and that the connection of nodes are according to Figure 3a, and assume that
pi˚, j˚q “ p5, 6q. In the output, we set the weight of e5,6 to zero, and convert all other undirected
weighted edges of the input tree to directed edges with the same weight. The direction of these
edges are outwards from nodes 5 (or 6). For each node j PM we set Rj to be the sum of the
weights of all outgoing edges from node j. For instance, due to Figure 3b, for node 2 we have
R2 “ w1,2 ` w2,3 “ HpV1,2|Zq `HpV2,3|Zq.
For any eij ‰ ei˚j˚ , we have rRpiqj ` rRpjqi “ HpVij|Zq, which leads to the sum rate:ÿ
jPM
Rj “ HpXM|Zq ´min
i,j
HpVij|Zq. (10)
The above equation proves that the rate assignment indeed achieves the lower-bound of
Inequality (9). It remains to show that the rates assigned to R1, . . . , Rm, according to the
rate assignment described in Figure 2, do meet the constraints of the LP problem described in
Figure 1. We show that for the assigned rates R1, . . . , Rm, and for any subset B ĹMÿ
jPB
Rj ě
ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPEB
HpVij|Zq, (11)
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Fig. 3: An example rate assignment to achieve RCOpXM|Zq.
is satisfied. Specifically, consider the case when ei˚j˚ P B. In this case we observe thatÿ
jPB
Rj ě
ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPEB
HpVij|Zq ´HpVi˚j˚ |Zq ` b,
where b ě HpVij|Zq for some j P B and i R B. Due to the definition of HpVi˚j˚ |Zq, then
condition (11) holds for any B containing pi˚, j˚q. The rest of the argument for other cases can
be found in Appendix B.
B. The Achievablity
We show that there exists an SKA Protocol that achieves the upper-bound in (7). This proves
the tightness of the bound.
In the SKA protocol, each pair of adjacent nodes pi, jq establish a pairwise key Sij of length
approximately equal to nC, where C “ mini,j HpVij|Zq. Then, each node j P M for every
i1 ‰ i and i1, i P Γpjq, sends Fji “ Sij ‘ Sji1 over the public channel, where ‘ is the bitwise
XOR operation. We show that the protocol results in a secure key shared among all terminals
in M. We note that our definition of secrecy (Def. 1) is different from the secrecy definition
in [3]. However, the two definitions are equivalent.
In our security proof, we use statistical distances of distributions. For instance, consider the ex-
ample of three terminals where X1 “ V12, X2 “ pV12, V23q, and X3 “ V23. Assume, HpV12|Zq ď
HpV23|Zq. Then for any δ ą 0, terminals generate pairwise secret keys S12 and S23 with length
` “ tnpHpV12|Zq ´ δqu that are p, σq´SKs; i.e., for any i, j SDppSij, Qij, Zq; pU,Qij, Zqq ď σ,
where U is uniform distribution over t0, 1u` and Qij denotes the public communication used to
generate Sij . By broadcasting F23 “ S12‘S23, all terminals will share K “ S12. Then we show
that K is a p2, 4σq´SK. The reliability proof is straightforward and for secrecy we use triangle
inequality for statistical distances. Let Q “ pQ12, Q23q. Then,
SDppK,F,Q, Zq; pU, F,Q, Zqq ď
SDppK,F,Q, Zq; pK,U,Q, Zqq`
SDppK,U,Q, Zq; pU,U,Q, Zqq`
SDppU,U,Q, Zq; pU, F,Q, Zqq ď σ ` σ ` 2σ “ 4σ,
where F “ pF,Qq is the overall public communication. See the full proof in Appendix A.
Lemma 3 (The Achievability). For a given Tree-PIN defined by G “ pM, Eq and PZXM , there
exists an SKA protocol P that achieves the maximum asymptotic secret key rate of
r˚P “ min
i,j
HpVij|Zq.
Proof of Lemma 3 is given in Appendix A.
IV. DISCUSSION
We prove the following upper bound on the WSK capacity of a general PIN model with
Vij “ Vji. We show that this bound is tight for the special case of A “M and |A| “ 2. See
Appendix C for the proof.
Lemma 4. For any PIN, we have
CWSKpXA||Zq ď minP
ˆ
1
|P | ´ 1
˙»——– ÿ
iăj s.t.
pi,jq crosses P
HpVij|Zq
fiffiffifl ,
where the minimization is over all partitions of M such that for every part of the partition there
exists a node in that part that is also in A. In a partition P a pair of nodes pi, jq crosses P , if
i and j are in different parts of P .
Moreover, we obtain the following lower bound on the WSK capacity of a general PIN with
Vij “ Vji, using the Steiner tree packing methods of [5]. A Steiner tree of G for terminals of
A is a subtree of G that spans (connects) all terminals in A. A family of edge-disjoint Steiner
trees is called a Steiner tree packing [15]. We show that for each family with ` Steiner trees, a
secret key of length ` can be generated. Let µpG,Aq denote the maximum cardinality of such
family. Therefore, for a general wiretapped PIN we have the following.
Corollary 1. The WSK of a PIN defined by G “ pM, Eq and PZXM for SKA in A Ď M is
lower-bounded by
CWSKpXA||Zq ě sup
nPN
1
n
µpGn,Aq,
where N is the set of n’s such that nHpVij|Zq for any pi, jq is integer-valued and for each n,
we define a multigraph Gn “ pM, Enq such that for any eij P E of G there exists nHpVij|Zq
edges between nodes i and j in En.
Proof: For a given n P N , each pair of connected nodes pi, jq establish a pairwise key Sij
of length approximately equal to nHpVij|Zq. Thus for any Steiner tree of the optimum Steiner
packing, terminals in A can establish one bit of shared secret key due to Theorem 2. Thus, the
asymptotic SK rate of supnPN 1nµpGn,Aq is achievable.
For the special case of A “M or |A| “ 2, the problem of calculating µpGn,Aq is efficiently
solvable [15]; rendering the above lower-bound to be tight for A “M or |A| “ 2.
Remark 1. Let RSKpXMq denote the minimum public communication rate1 required for achiev-
ing CSKpXMq. It was proved in [16] that for any PIN model we have RSKpXMq “ pm ´
2qCSKpXMq. We show that for any Tree-PIN we have RWSKpXM|Zq ď pm´2qCWSKpXM||Zq,
where RWSK denotes the minimum public communication rate required for achieving the WSK
capacity. We conjecture that this bound is tight for any PIN. See Appendix D.
Remark 2. We note that Theorem 2 is consistent with the result of [3, Example 7] for a Markov
Chain defined on a tree. Our direct proof for Theorem 2 presents an SKA protocol that does not
require omniscience; however, the proposed protocol of [3] needs to achieve omniscience which
requires communication rate of at least HpXM|Zq ´mini,j HpVij|Zq.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
In this section, we prove that for any given Tree-PIN with terminals M “ rms and graph
G “ pM, Eq and distribution PZXM , there exists an SKA protocol that achieves the upper-
bound of (7) on the wiretap secret key capacity of key agreement for A “ M. We assume
that each terminal j P M has access to |Γpjq| randomness extractors tExtij| i P Γpjqu, for
extracting pairwise secure keys between terminal (node) j and its neighbors. Our proposed
capacity achieving SKA for a Tree-PIN, is non-interactive. This means that each terminal j
broadcasts messages that are only functions of the terminal’s local observation Xnj , and it’s local
variables.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the Tree-PIN, is labeled such that node 1 is adjacent
to node 2 and |Γp1q| “ 1. Thus, the edge e12 will be included in all paths from node 1 to other
nodes in the tree. If the path from i1 to node if , goes through the nodes i2, i3, . . . , if´1, then we
denote the path from i1 to if by Pathpi1 Ñ if q “ pei1i2 , ei2i3 , ¨ ¨ ¨ , eif´1if q.
All terminals in M will participate in an SKA protocol, described in the pseudo-code P. In
the first phase of the protocol, each terminal j obtains a shared secret key with each member of
Γpjq. Let Sij denote the pairwise shared key for any adjacent nodes i and j. Then, all terminals
cut the first λ bits of their obtained keys, so that all pairwise keys have the same length. The
shortened pairwise keys are S 1ij “ Sij|λ. The parameter λ is a protocol parameter that has to be
calculated before running the protocol, according to the known joint distribution PZXM .
During the public communication phase of protocol P, each node j finds the unique node
j˚ P Γpjq that is closest to node 2. For any other node k P Γpjqztj˚u, node j broadcasts
Fjk “ S 1jj˚ ‘ S 1jk. Thus, the total number of broadcasts by node j is |Γpjq| ´ 1. Note that each
broadcast only uses local variables of node j and so the SKA protocol P is non-interactive.
In the last phase of the protocol, terminals 1 and 2 set their final shared keys to be K1 “ K2 “
S 112, and the rest of the terminals calculate their obtained keys Kj using the public broadcasted
messages (see Protocol P, line 14).
Key Rate of the Protocol: It is known that [1, 2] the pairwise WSK capacity of a pair
of terminals i and j with access to an n´IID copy of a random variable Vij is HpVij|Zq.
That is, there exists a family of pn, σnq SKA protocols with limnÑ8pn ` σnq “ 0, where
lengthpSijq “ tn pHpVij|Zq ´∆nqu for some ∆npn ` σnq such that limnÑ8 ∆n “ 0. To start
protocol P, fix an arbitrary δ ą 0 which is smaller that mini,j HpVij|Zq and choose any λ such
that
λ ď n
ˆ
min
i,j
HpVij|Zq ´ δ ´∆n
˙
.
Due to the reliability of the protocol (proved next), every node j PM, can obtain the same
key K “ S 112 with length λ. Thus, the SKA protocol P, can achieve the asymptotic SK rate of
r˚P “ lim
nÑ8
1
n
lengthpS 112q “ lim
nÑ8
1
n
λ
Protocol P: SKA for a Tree-PIN
Known: Network configuration due to undirected tree G “ pM, Eq with M “ rms, and
the joint distribution PZXM
Assumption: Node 2 is the only neighbor of node 1, i.e., Γp1q “ t2u
Input: A set of m´ 1 extractors tExtij| i ă j and eij P Eu
Input: Observations (n´IID samples) XnM by all terminals
Output: Global keys K “ pK1, . . . , Kmq, extracted locally by each terminal in M
Parameter: λ
// Establishing Pairwise Secret Keys
1 for i PM
2 for j ą i
3 if j P Γpiq then // Nodes (terminals) i and j are adjacent
4 Terminals i and j do extract pairwise keys Sij “ Sji “ ExtijpV nij q
5 and do save the first λ bits in S 1ij Ð Sij|λ
// Public Discussion Phase
6 for j ě 2
7 if |Γpjq| ą 1 then // Node (terminal) j has more than one neighbor
8 Terminal j do find node j˚ P Γpjq s.t. dp1, j˚q ă dp1, iq @i P Γpjqztj˚u, and
9 foreach i P Γpjqztj˚u, terminal j do broadcasts Fji “ S 1jj˚ ‘ S 1ji
// Key Extraction Phase
10 Terminals 1 and 2 set their keys to K1 “ K2 “ S 112.
11 for j ě 3
12 Terminal j do find node j˚ P Γpjq s.t. dp2, j˚q ă dp2, iq @i P Γpjqztj˚u, then
13 do find Pathpj Ñ 2q, the path from node j to node 2, then
14 do compute Kj “ S 1jj˚
À
ia,ib PM
s.t. eiaibPPathpjÑ2q
Fiaib
ď lim
nÑ8mini,j HpVij|Zq ´ δ ´∆n
“ min
i,j
HpVij|Zq ´ δ.
Since, δ can take any small value, then as δ Ñ 0, the SK rate of P will be arbitrary close to
C “ mini,j HpVij|Zq.
Next, we show that the WSK capacity achieving SKA protocol P is secure and reliable for
any given Tree-PIN. To prove this claim, we need to show
1) Reliability: Showing that Pr tK1 “ K2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ Km “ Ku Ñ 1 as nÑ 8, and
2) Security: Showing that SD ppK,F, Zq; pU,F, Zqq Ñ 0 as nÑ 8.
Reliability Proof:
Let Kj denote the final key calculated by terminal j. We show that K1 “ K2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “
Km “ S 112 “ K, if all m ´ 1 pairwise pn, σnq´SKs Sij are established. For any node
j P Mzt1, 2u there is only one path to node 2. This path is of the form Pathpj Ñ 2q “
pejj˚ , ej˚i1 , ei1i2 , ei2i3 , ¨ ¨ ¨ , eif2q, where node j˚ is the unique neighbor of j which is closest to
node 2 and ik’s (i “ 1 . . . f ) are the labels for all the nodes (except for j, j˚ and 2) that are in
the path of j to 2.
In protocol P, line 9, node k broadcasts Fkj “ S 1i1k‘S 1kj . Thus, node j who has access to the
key S 1kj can perfectly recover S 1i1k by computing S
1
kj ‘ Fkj . Also, node i1 (which is connected
to i2 and k) has broadcasted Fi1k “ S 1i2i1 ‘ S 1i1k. Node j who has now have recovered S 1i1k, can
recover S 1i2i1 as well, by computing S
1
i1k
‘Fi1k. This chain of recovering local keys will continue
until S 112 is recovered by computing Kj “ S 1kj ‘ Fkj ‘ Fi1k ‘ Fi2i1 ‘ Fi3i2 ‘ ¨ ¨ ¨ ‘ F2if , which
proves that Kj “ S 112 for any j PM.
This requires all m´ 1 pairwise pn, σnq´SKs Sij to be established. The error probability of
each pairwise key is bounded by n, thus the error probability of establishing the global key is
pm´ 1qn “ |E |n. Therefore,
Pr tK1 “ K2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ Km “ Ku ď 1´ 1n
with 1n “ |E |n where n such that limnÑ8 n “ 0.
Security Proof:
We need to prove the secrecy of the global shared key K. Without loss of generality, assume
that all adjacent terminal pairs i and j with eij P E have established a binary pairwise pn, σnq´SK
Sij with length ` “ tnpC ´ δqu, where C “ mini,j HpVij|Zq. Note that for any eij P E we have
SDppSij, Qij, Zq; pU,Qij, Zqq ď σn, where U is the uniform distribution over t0, 1u` and Qij
denotes the public communication used to generate Sij . Recall that the statistical distance between
RVs X and Y , is defined as
SDpX;Y q “ 1
2
ÿ
wPW
|PXpwq ´ PY pwq|
“ max
T ĎW
ÿ
wPT
PXpwq ´ PY pwq
“
ÿ
wPT ˚
PXpwq ´ PY pwq,
where T ˚ “ tw PW | PXpwq ě PY pwqu.
Let Q denote the collection of all public communications required to establish all |E | “ m´1
pairwise keys Sij , and let F denote the collection of all public communications broadcasted by
all terminals during the SKA protocol P and F “ pF,Qq be the overall public communication.
For any given Tree-PIN PZXM with G “ pM, Eq we prove that
SDppK,F, Zq; pU,F, Zqq “ SDppK,F,Q, Zq; pU, F,Q, Zqq
ď SDppK,F,Q, Zq; pU,U,Q, Zqq ` SDppU,U,Q, Zq; pU, F,Q, Zqq
ď |E |σn ` |E |σn ď 2|E |σn,
First we show that “the combination pK,F q uniquely gives all pairwise keys tSijuiăj”. Recall
that any pairwise key belongs to the alphabet K “ t0, 1u`. Let s “ tsijuiăj P K|E| be an instance
of all pairwise keys. Note that F “ F pSq is a set of m´2 linear functions2 of the random vector
S. Thus, the m´2 elements of F are not sufficient for uniquely finding all m´1 pairwise keys
in S. However, the combination of F and the final key K resulted by the SKA protocol P is
2According to Protocol P each terminal j PM broadcasts |Γpjq| ´ 1 messages. Also recall that for any tree |E | “ m ´ 1.
Thus, the total number of public messages is
ř
jPM |Γpjq| ´ 1 “ 2|E | ´m “ m´ 2.
sufficient for unique recalculation of all pairwise keys. Remember that K “ S12 and with all the
public messages of terminal 2 one can recover all pairwise keys accessible to terminal 2 since
they are all of the form F2j “ S12‘S2j for all j P Γp2qzt1u. Now with access to these pairwise
keys one can recover all pairwise keys accessible to any terminal j P Γp2qzt1u. This chain of
calculation will continue until all pairwise keys are recovered.
Since pK,F q uniquely gives tSijuiăj, then
SDppK,F,Q, Zq; pU,U,Q, Zqq ď SDpptSiju, Q, Zq; pU |E|, Q, Zqq ď |E |σn.
Also, we have SDppU,U,Q, Zq; pU, F,Q, Zqq ď |E |σn, because,
SDppU,U,Q, Zq; pU, F,Q, Zqq “ SDppU, F,Q, Zq; pU,U,Q, Zqq “ SDppF,Q, Zq; pU,Q,Zqq
(a)“
ÿ
pf,q,zqPT ˚
PQZpq, zqPF |QZpf |q, zq ´ PQZpq, zqPUpfq
“
ÿ
pq,zqPT ˚
PQZpq, zq
ÿ
fPT ˚
PF |QZpf |q, zq ´ 1{|K|
(b)ď
ÿ
pq,zqPT ˚
PQZpq, zq
ÿ
fPT ˚
PF |QZpf |q, zq ´ 1{|K||E|
(c)“
ÿ
pq,zqPT ˚
PQZpq, zq
ÿ
sPS˚pT ˚q
ź
iăj
PSij |QijZpsij|qij, zq ´ 1{|K||E|
(d)ď max
T ĎQˆZˆK|E|
ÿ
pq,zqPT
PQZpq, zq
ÿ
sPT
ź
iăj
PSij |QijZpsij|qij, zq ´
ź
iăj
PUpsijq
(e)“ SDpptSiju, Q, Zq; pU |E|, Q, Zqq
ď
ÿ
iăj
SDppSij, Qij, Zq; pU,Qij, Zqq
ď |E |σn,
where in (a) T ˚ “ tpf, q, zq|PQZpq, zqPF |QZpf |q, zq ě PQZpq, zqPUpfqu and in (c) S˚pT ˚q is
defined as S˚pT ˚q “ ts | s P K|E| and F psq “ f, @f P T ˚u. Inequality (c) is due to the fact
that for any pf, q, zq P T ˚ we have PF |QZpf |q, zq ě 1{|K|. Inequalities (d) and (e) are due to
the definition of the statistical distance.
Hence, the final key K obtained from the SKA protocol P is an p|E |n, 2|E |σnq´SK where
limnÑ8pn ` σnq “ 0 and the security proof is complete.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In this section, we prove Theorem 2 that gives the WSK capacity of a Tree-PIN for key
agreement among terminals of a subset A ĎM. We prove that for a Tree-PIN specified by the
graph G “ pM, Eq and probability distribution PZXM , we have
CWSKpXA||Zq “ min
i,jPT pAq
HpVij|Zq,
where T pAq is the subtree of G with the least number of nodes that connects all nodes of A.
Recall that (due to [3, Theorem 4])
CWSKpXA||Zq ď CPKpXA||Zq
where CPK denotes the PK capacity of the associated PIN model given by M1 “ rm` 1s and
G1 “ pM1, E 1q with a dummy node m`1 representing the adversary as depicted in section III-A.
From Theorem 1 we know
CPKpXA||Zq “ HpXM|Zq ´RCOpXA|Zq,
where RCOpXA|Zq denotes the solution to the Linear Programming (LP) problem of Figure 4,
defined over real numbers [3].
Minimize:
ř
jPM
Rj
Subject to:
ř
jPB
Rj ě HpXB|XBc , Zq, @B ĹM, A Ę B (a)
Rj P R`, @j PM. (b)
Fig. 4: The LP problem of finding RCOpXA|Zq.
We prove that
RCOpXA|Zq “ HpXM|Zq ´ min
i,jPT pAq
HpVij|Zq. (12)
The proof is by first, proving the inequality (13) and then presenting a rate assignment that
achieves the equality, hence proving Equation (12).
RCOpXA|Zq ě HpXM|Zq ´ min
i,jPT pAq
HpVij|Zq. (13)
Proof of Inequality (13): The terminals in M form a Tree-PIN G “ pM, Eq. By cutting
(removing) the edge ei1j1 P E that connects nodes i1 and j1, we will have two trees GxBy “ pB, EBq
and GxBcy “ pBc, EBcq, such that P “ tB,Bcu is a partition of M, and nodes i1 and j1 each
belong to one part of the partition. and EBc Y EB “ Eztei1j1u.
Consider the constraints of the LP problem in Figure 1 written two times for subsets B and
Bc individually, and note that A Ę B and A Ę Bc. We will have,ÿ
jPB
Rj ě HpXB|XBc , Zq, (14)ÿ
jPBc
Rj ě HpXBc |XB, Zq. (15)
From Slepian-Wolf source coding theorem we know that inequality (14), means that if a decoder
has access to side informations XBc and Z, then by receiving the public messages broadcasted by
terminals of B, they can reliably recover XB. Also, recall that XB “ ŤiPB Vij , and that if i P B
and j R B, then HpVij|XBc , Zq “ 0, since Vij P XBc . Due to the mutual independence of Vij’s
and their correlation with Z (i.e., PZ|XM “
ś
i,j PZij |Vij ), we get HpXM|Zq “
ř
i,j HpVij|Zq,
and thus we can translate inequalities (14) and (15) toÿ
jPB
Rj ě
ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPEB
HpVij|Zq,
ÿ
jPBc
Rj ě
ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPEBc
HpVij|Zq.
By adding these two inequalities, we arrive atÿ
jPM
Rj ě
ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPEB
HpVij|Zq `
ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPEBc
HpVij|Zq
“
ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPE
HpVij|Zq ´HpVi1j1 |Zq
“ HpXM|Zq ´HpVi1j1 |Zq,
where ei1j1 denotes the edge that connects the two trees GxBy and GxBcy. We also used the facts
that EBc Y EB “ Eztei1j1u and that the sets tXj| @j PMu and tVjk| j ă k, ejk P Eu are indeed
equivalent. The above inequality holds for any pair i1 and j1 of terminals with ei1j1 P E and their
induced partition tB,Bcu, where A Ę B and A Ę Bc. Thus,
RCOpXA|Zq ě max
i,jPT pAq
tHpXM|Zq ´HpVij|Zqu,
“ HpXM|Zq ´ min
i,jPT pAq
HpVij|Zq,
which proves the Inequality (13).
To complete the proof of Equation (12), we prove that the rate assignment protocol in Figure 2
achieves the bound (13).
Proof of Equation (12):
First, let pi˚, j˚q be defined as follows,
HpVi˚j˚ |Zq “ min
i,jPT pAq
HpVij|Zq.
Then let the Rj rates be chosen according to the rate assignment in Figure 5.
This rate assignment satisfies the following equation,rRpiqj ` rRpjqi “ HpVij|Zq, @i, j PM s.t. eij P Eztei˚j˚u, (16)
which leads to the following sum rate:ÿ
jPM
Rj “
ÿ
jPM
ÿ
iPΓpjq
rRpjqi “ ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPE
rRpjqi ` rRpiqj “ ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPE
HpVij|Zq ´HpVi˚j˚ |Zq
“ HpXM|Zq ´HpVi˚j˚ |Zq “ HpXM|Zq ´ min
i,jPT pAq
HpVij|Zq. (17)
Thus, the rate assignment indeed achieves the lower-bound of Inequality (13). We, however,
need to show that this rate assignment satisfies the constraints of the LP problem described in
Figure 4.
Let pi˚, j˚q s.t. HpVi˚j˚ |Zq “ min
i,jPT pAq
HpVij|Zq
For any j PM let Rj “ ř
iPΓpjq
rRpjqi .
To minimize
ř
jPM
Rj
assign rRpj˚qi˚ “ rRpi˚qj˚ “ 0, and
@ eij ‰ ei˚j˚ , with dpi, i˚q ă dpj, i˚q,
assign rRpjqi “ 0, and rRpiqj “ HpVij|Zq.
Fig. 5: The rate assignment that achieves RCOpXA|Zq.
First, note that condition (b) in the LP in Figure 4 is satisfied as all assigned rates are non-
negative. The constraints (a) in the LP can be rewritten for an arbitrary subset of terminals
(nodes) B ĹM,A Ę B as ÿ
jPB
Rj ě
ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPEB
HpVij|Zq, (18)
where the set EB “ teij| eij P E , and i P B, and j P Bu is the set of all edges contained
within B (any edge that connects a node of B to a node not in B is not in EB). We show in
the following that the rate assignment of Figure 2, satisfies the inequality (18) for any arbitrary
subset B ĹM,A Ę B. The proof is broken into two cases: Case I) The case of ei˚j˚ R EB, and
Case II) The case of ei˚j˚ P EB.
Case I) ei˚j˚ R EB
The left hand side of the inequality (18), can be written as,ÿ
jPB
Rj “
ÿ
jPB
ÿ
iPΓpjq
rRpjqi
“
ÿ
jPB
¨˚
˚˝ ÿ
iPΓpjq
iPB
rRpjqi ` ÿ
iPΓpjq
iRB
rRpjqi ‹˛‹‚
paqě
ÿ
jPB
ÿ
iPΓpjq
iPB
rRpjqi “ ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPEB
rRpjqi ` rRpiqj
pbq“
ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPEB
HpVij|Zq,
where, in the (a) we used the non-negativity property of the rates, and in (b) we used Equa-
tion (16).
Case II) ei˚j˚ P EB
The left hand side of the inequality (18), can be written as,ÿ
jPB
Rj “
ÿ
jPB
ÿ
iPΓpjq
rRpjqi
“
ÿ
jPB
¨˚
˚˝ ÿ
iPΓpjq
iPB
rRpjqi ` ÿ
iPΓpjq
iRB
rRpjqi ‹˛‹‚
“ rRpj˚qi˚ ` rRpi˚qj˚ ` ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPEBztei˚j˚u
rRpjqi ` rRpiqj `ÿ
jPB
ÿ
iPΓpjq
iRB
rRpjqi
paq“ 0`
ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPEBztei˚j˚u
HpVij|Zq `
ÿ
jPB
ÿ
iPΓpjq
iRB
HpVij|Zq
pbqě
ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPEBztei˚j˚u
HpVij|Zq `HpVi˚j˚ |Zq
“
ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPEB
HpVij|Zq.
Note that in the (a), we used Equation (16), and in (b) we used the fact that HpVi˚j˚ |Zq ď
HpVij|Zq. Note that B ĹM, which means there always exists at least one node in T pAq such
that i R B and i P Γpjq (is in the neighborhood of j) for some node j P B. Thus, the third sum
on the right hand side of (b) is always larger than HpVi˚j˚ |Zq.
With the proof of Case I and Case II, the proof of Equation (12) is complete.
Equation (12) immediately implies that
CWSKpXA||Zq ď min
i,jPT pAq
HpVij|Zq,
which can be achieved by the SKA protocol P for any Tree-PIN T pAq. See Appendix A. This
completes the proof of Theorem 2.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 4 AND THE PROOF OF TIGHTNESS OF THE BOUND IN COROLLARY 1 FOR
|A| “ 2 AND A “M
First, we prove Lemma 4.
Proof:
According to [3, Theorem 4] CWSKpXA||Zq ď CPKpXA||Zq, and for any B ĂM we haveÿ
jPB
Rj ě
ÿ
iăj
s.t. eijPEB
HpVij|Zq. (19)
Consider a partition P “ tB1, . . . , B|P|u of M. Then, corresponding to each part of P we haveÿ
jPBck
Rj ě HpXM|Zq ´
ÿ
iPBk
ÿ
jPBk
iăj
HpVij|Zq.
By adding all |P | inequalities we get
p|P | ´ 1q
ÿ
jPM
Rj ě |P |HpXM|Zq ´
|P|ÿ
k“1
ÿ
iPBk
ÿ
jPBk
iăj
HpVij|Zq
“ p|P | ´ 1qHpXM|Zq ´
ÿ
iăj s.t.
pi,jq crosses P
HpVij|Zq,
which implies,
RCOpXA|Zq ě HpXM|Zq ´ 1|P | ´ 1
ÿ
iăj s.t.
pi,jq crosses P
HpVij|Zq,
and thus due to Theorem 1
CPKpXA||Zq ď 1|P | ´ 1
ÿ
iăj s.t.
pi,jq crosses P
HpVij|Zq.
Which is also an upper on the WSK capacity CWSKpXA||Zq.
Proof of tightness of the bound in Corollary 1 for |A| “ 2 and A “M. A Steiner tree of
G for terminals of A is a subtree of G that spans (connects) all terminals in A. A family of
edge-disjoint Steiner trees is called a Steiner tree packing [15]. Let µpG,Aq denote the maximum
cardinality of such family. It has been proved [15, See Menger’s theorem in Section 3.3] that
When |A| “ 2 then the problem of maximal Steiner Tree Packing in multigraph Gn “ pM, Enq
will reduce to the problem of finding maximum number of edge-disjoint paths connecting the
two terminals in A. Thus, for any multigraph Gn “ pM, Enq and any arbitrary subset A ĎM
with |A| “ 2 we have
µpGn,Aq “ min
BĹM
s.t. AĘB
|teij P En|pi, jq crosses P “ tB,Bcuu| .
Therefore, we will have the following lower bound.
CWSKpXA||Zq
paqě sup
nPN
1
n
µpGn,Aq
pbq“ min
BĹM
s.t. AĘB
»——– ÿ
iăj s.t.
pi,jq crosses P“tB,Bcu
HpVij|Zq
fiffiffifl
pcq“ CPKpXA||Zq,
where (a) is due to Corollary 1, (b) is due to Menger’s Theorem, and (c) is due to Lemma 4.
This proves the tightness of the bound in Corollary 1 for |A| “ 2.
For the special case of A “M, in the problem of maximal Steiner Tree Packing in multi-
graph Gn “ pM, Enq the exact value of µpGn,Mq is known due to the Tutte/Nash-Williams
Theorem [15, Section 3.5], which is
µpGn,Mq “ min
P
t
|teij P En|pi, jq crosses Pu|
|P | ´ 1 u.
Therefore, we have
CWSKpXM||Zq
paqě sup
nPN
1
n
µpGn,Mq
pbq“ min
P
ˆ
1
|P | ´ 1
˙»——– ÿ
iăj s.t.
pi,jq crosses P
HpVij|Zq
fiffiffifl ,
pcq“ CPKpXM||Zq,
where (a) is due to Corollary 1, (b) is due to Tutte/Nash-Williams Theorem, and (c) is due to
Lemma 4. This proves the tightness of the bound in Corollary 1 for A “M.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF REMARK 1
Proof: According to protocol P, any terminal j P M finds its unique neighbor j˚ that is
closest to node 1 and broadcasts |Γpjq| ´ 1 encoded messages tFji| @i P Γpjqztj˚uu, each of
length λ. Thus, the public communication rate of the protocol is
1
n
mÿ
j“1
λˆ p|Γpjq| ´ 1q
“ pλ{nq ˆ
˜
mÿ
j“1
|Γpjq| ´m
¸
“ pλ{nq p2|E | ´mq “ pλ{nq p2pm´ 1q ´mq
“ pm´ 2qλ{n.
In the above, we used the facts that for a graph G “ pM, Eq, we have řjPM |Γpjq| “ 2|E |, and
for any undirected tree with m vertexes we have |E | “ m´ 1.
Knowing that λ ď nmini,j HpVij|Zq and the fact that Protocol P achieves the WSK capacity
of a Tree-PIN, namely mini,j HpVij|Zq, shows that for given Tree-PIN G “ pM, Eq we have
RWSKpXM|Zq ď pm ´ 2qCWSKpXM||Zq. Our result on the WSK capacity of Tree-PINs, is
another strong evidence for supporting the conjecture about the tightness of this bound, even for
the WSK setting.
